Russian-American MPC&A

Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting in the Russian Federation

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as told to Debra A. Daugherty

Los Alamos Science  Number 24  1996
Nuclear proliferation and terrorism pose serious threats to the United States. Fortunately for us and the world at large, nuclear weapons are difficult to obtain whether by theft or by one’s own labor. The five recognized nuclear weapons states (United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China) guard their nuclear weapons very tightly, and undeclared nuclear states, compelled by their own secrecy, probably also protect their weapons well. Furthermore, most nations have formally agreed to forego the development of nuclear weapons and to submit all their nuclear activities to international inspection by signing the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).

However, a number of states, as well as certain terrorist groups, have shown interest in constructing their own weapons. Their greatest challenge is not designing the weapon but rather obtaining weapons-grade “fissile materials,” either highly enriched uranium or plutonium, neither of which exist in nature. Because the production of those nuclear explosives requires a significant expenditure of time and money, potential nuclear weapons states may prefer the alternative—obtaining the materials by theft.
Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, that prospect has become even more worrisome. Economic decline and political unrest within the former Soviet Union have raised concern about the security of nuclear materials there, and reports of small amounts of weapons-grade material found in Germany and other places during the past five years have fed that concern. As a result the United States has taken an active role in helping the Russians maintain the security of their nuclear materials.

Los Alamos scientists became involved in that effort in 1992 as part of the Nunn-Lugar-sponsored “government-to-government” programs initiated immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union. But, through an outgrowth of the “lab-to-lab” scientific conversion program between Los Alamos and Arzamas-16, its sister city in Russia, the program in nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting—or MPC&A—has been able to make substantial progress. This article traces the development and accomplishments of lab-to-lab MPC&A and discusses the impact of that program on the larger government-to-government program.

The History Behind MPC&A

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union accumulated enough weapons-grade fissile material to build tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. Both countries have also been acutely aware of the various threats of theft, which range from armed attack by commandos to the more insidious threat from insiders, and both have implemented safeguards to defend their fissile materials. Yet, their approaches have been very different. In the United States, an external threat—for example, an overt armed attack on a nuclear facility or the hijacking of a nuclear shipment in transit—is countered by physical protection, such as armed guards and high fences. The more subtle internal threat—covert diversion or theft of nuclear materials—is countered by internal control systems, for example, computerized materials control and accounting systems. Those consist of sophisticated radiation sensors integrated with a network of computers that monitor nuclear materials from the moment they enter a facility to the time they leave again. Together, the United States refers to those safeguards against external and internal threats as MPC&A.

In the Soviet Union, however, both external and internal threats have historically been handled by physical protection combined with strong “people control.” Whereas most Soviet nuclear facilities were surrounded by physical security to deter and defend against external attackers, it was the “people control” that prevented theft by insiders. The omnipresence of the KGB and the threat of harsh penalties made clandestine behavior among insiders unlikely. That system, under the Soviets, was considered virtually impenetrable.

In recent years, however, fundamental economic, political, and social changes in Russia have put that system into question. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, weapons funding plummeted drastically as the economy, rather than the military, came to the forefront of Russia’s concerns. Likewise, the welfare of the formerly honored Soviet defense workers was suddenly in serious jeopardy. Their salaries were frozen by the government and eroded by inflation such that, today, a typical weapons scientist is paid about 30 to 50 dollars per month. Financial need and possible disillusionment among Russian nuclear workers might make the surreptitious diversion of even a small amount of weapons-grade fissile material all too tempting.

Yet, thankfully, there have not been any violations of Russian nuclear safeguards that resulted in the loss of enough nuclear material for a weapon. Although confident that their system remains relatively secure, the Russians want to add controls and accounting to their existing physical protection to bring their nuclear safeguards into line with their new socio-political order. Russian weapons scientists and government officials alike have expressed in-
terest in adopting controls and accounting techniques like those used in the United States.

In November 1991, the Nunn-Lugar bill redirected four hundred million dollars of Department of Defense (DOD) funds to assist with the “transportation, storage, safeguarding, and destruction of nuclear and other weapons [and] the prevention of weapons proliferation.” Two Nunn-Lugar programs specifically funded MPC&A. Under one program, a storage facility for fissile materials from nuclear weapons dismantled under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) would be constructed and equipped with MPC&A systems. Under the other, MPC&A improvements would be implemented at civilian Russian nuclear institutes. Unfortunately, both of those programs initially moved relatively slowly.

Fortunately, at the same time, some of us from Los Alamos had the chance to informally discuss many aspects of MPC&A theory and design with the Russian scientists from Arzamas-16. Although the Russians were not familiar with computerized controls and accounting, they learned quickly, and our conversations with the Arzamas-16 scientists, especially Sergei Zykov and Vladimir Yuferev, later formed the basis of our joint work with Arzamas-16 under the auspices of the lab-to-lab MC&A program.

While our relationship with those scientists was forming, numerous reports of nuclear materials theft in 1992 and 1993 prompted the Senate Armed Services Committee to address nuclear materials safeguards in the former Soviet Union and the potential for nuclear proliferation. Under Secretary of Energy Charles Curtis attended those hearings and was urged to accelerate efforts being made through government-to-government channels. Two days later Sigfried Hecker, the Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, had an introductory meeting with the newly appointed Curtis, and Curtis asked him if anything could be done to help the Russians safeguard their nuclear materials.

Hecker had a ready answer. He suggested that the lab-to-lab scientific collaborations with Arzamas-16 (see “Lab-to-Lab Scientific Collaborations Between Los Alamos and Arzamas-16 Using Explosive-Driven Flux-Compensation Generators”) be extended to include MPC&A. Curtis made sure that two million dollars from the Department of Energy (DOE) 1994 budget were allocated to get the program started, and Mark Mullen, Gene Kutyreff, and I (Ron Augustson) began to develop a plan.

We designed the lab-to-lab MPC&A program to be a joint effort like the scientific program. Money would be divided into three roughly equal parts: Russian salaries, American salaries, and equipment. Our initial effort would focus on creating a demonstration of MPC&A for the officials at nuclear institutions that would show them what could be done. In June 1994, a small delegation from Los Alamos went to Russia to negotiate and sign contracts, and our first stop was Arzamas-16. In two days, we signed six contracts with Arzamas. Under the first five, we would produce specific products for computerized controls and accounting. Under the sixth, we would combine the products of the first five contracts into a demonstration that could be used to raise interest in materials control and accounting among the leaders of the Russian nuclear institutes.

That summer we also signed contracts with scientists from the Kurchatov Institute, Chelyabinsk-70, and in November, the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering at Obninsk. We teamed up with five other U.S. national laboratories—Brookhaven, Lawrence Livermore, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia—and since then, progress has been rapid at Arzamas-16, IPPE, and the Kurchatov Institute. In the following sections, we describe the work done at those three nuclear institutes, and using the demonstration at Arzamas-16 as a guide, we elaborate on the various features and procedures of MPC&A.

### Arzamas-16

Arzamas-16, a city located about 250 miles east of Moscow, existed in complete secrecy throughout the cold war, unheard of to all Soviet citizens outside the Soviet defense complex. Although its name and location are now public knowledge, Arzamas-16 remains a closed city to this day. Forty miles of double fence surround the city and armed guards from the Interior Ministry patrol the perimeter. Visitors to the city are scrutinized and subjected to severe restrictions.\(^1\) Physical protection against outside threats is formidable.

To protect against insiders, however, the scientists at Arzamas-16 wanted to develop a materials controls and accounting (MC&A) system like the one we discussed during work on the Nunn-Lugar storage facility. For a start, we decided to develop a realistic demonstration that would not only arouse the interest of officials at other facilities, but would also serve as a starting point within Arzamas-16 from which the MC&A could spread. The demonstration was a very ambitious prototype with many different components (see Figure 2) that provides a test bed for instruments and systems elements. Although it was designed as if it were to be applied at a storage facility, the demonstration was equipped with instruments that are useful for all sorts of nuclear facilities. (The demonstration does not duplicate any system that will actually be installed.) In all, thirty-nine integrated systems were installed, about half of which were Russian. We Americans contributed financial support, advice, and equipment, but the demonstration was designed and constructed entirely by the Russians.

Nuclear facilities in general are run by four different groups of people who perform four different tasks: protection, management, security, and materials

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\(^1\) Not only are visitors required to apply for permission from MinAtom a month and a half in advance of their visit, but all cameras, computers, and listening devices are taken away from them as they enter the city.
Figure 2. The Arzamas-16 Demonstration
This is a conceptual diagram of the Arzamas-16 demonstration MC&A system. Controls, which limit and monitor access to materials, are shown in green, instruments for accounting in blue, and the three Materials Balance rooms in yellow. All controls and accounting equipment are connected to a computer terminal in each Materials Balance room, and the terminal is connected to the central controls and accounting computers in the Manager’s office. Bar code readers play a dual-role between controls and accounting. Not only are they used to identify containers, they also track the movement of materials through the facility.
handling. To promote control, the workers are typically separated on the basis of the task they perform. The protection forces work outside the facility. Inside, managers are limited to the Manager’s Office, while security officers and materials handlers work in the Materials Balance rooms (shown in yellow in Figure 2). That separation of functions helps prevent theft.

The demonstration was designed such that managers, security officers, and materials handlers all enter the facility through a single entrance, called Personnel Entry, that is separate from the entrance for materials. As they enter, workers pass through radiation and metal detectors, and their identity is determined by a palm reader, badge reader, and personal identification number (see Figure 3). The computerized MC&A system then unlocks the appropriate door at the end of the Personnel Entry to let managers into the Manager’s Office and security officers and materials handlers to the Key Access area. After passing through the Entry, managers no longer interact with security officers and materials handlers directly.

Instead, managers “oversee” the operation of the facility via two central computers. The central computers are connected to computer terminals in each of the Materials Balance rooms, which, in turn, are connected to the controls and accounting instruments in those rooms. One of the central computers, the “accounting” computer, keeps an inventory of the material in every room that is updated in real time as containers of nuclear material enter, exit, and move through the facility. The other computer, the “controls” computer, supervises the movement of materials within the facility and restricts access to materials.

Under the watchful eye of the managers, materials handlers and security officers obtain keys to the Materials Balance rooms from the Key Access area. They are required to operate in teams of three that consist of two materials handlers and a security officer. All three must be identified by their palm, badge, and personal identification number. Then, if the team has permission from the Manager’s Office, a key to the appropriate room will be released from the keyboard.

To illustrate the operation of the facility, let us assume that a team has obtained a key to the Entry/Exit Control room (on the left in Figure 2), where workers check the contents of incoming and outgoing containers of nuclear material. Newly-arrived containers are brought to the door of the Entry/Exit Control room by a conveyor belt, each with paperwork that lists the container’s identification number and contents. Each container also has a bar code, which encodes the same information as the paperwork. At the door to the Entry/Exit Control room, a worker uses a hand-held scanner to read each container’s bar code and checks the results with the paperwork. Because the scanner is connected to the accounting computer in the Manager’s Office, the new container is automatically registered into the inventory of the facility.

Even if the paperwork and bar code agree, the team weighs the container to make sure its mass is consistent with the alleged contents, and they visually inspect the container’s seal to make sure it hasn’t been opened. They also verify the identity of the container by measuring its “radiation passport” (see Figure 4). In that way, the team checks and rechecks the validity of the container by independent methods.

When the team has finished inspect-
ing the container in the Entry/Exit Control room, it can be taken to the Assembly/Disassembly room or straight to the Vault. Let us assume that, because the material arrived in shipping containers, the team must take the material to the Assembly/Disassembly room to put it in storage containers. Before they leave Entry/Exit Control, one worker must enter the destination of the container into the computer terminal. Another worker reads the container’s bar code, which makes the central controls computer start a timer. If the container is not detected in the Assembly/Disassembly room in a certain amount of time, the controls computer will sound an alarm.

When the container’s bar code is read at the door to the Assembly/Disassembly room, the timer is stopped.

**Figure 4. The Radiation Passport**
The “radiation passport,” which is a low-resolution measurement of the gamma-ray spectrum and neutron flux emitted by a container of nuclear material, provides a unique and highly reliable method of identifying individual containers. The graph on the right shows two low-resolution gamma-ray spectra. Each peak in a given spectrum corresponds to gamma rays of a given energy, and the relative heights of those peaks are unique to a given container.

A record of the radiation passport for each container is stored in the central accounting computer. When a new container arrives at a facility, its identity is checked by measuring its radiation passport and comparing it with the passport on record for that container. If, for example, the two spectra in the figure were the measured and recorded passports, the central accounting computer would reject the alleged identity of the container.

**Figure 5. Gamma-ray Detector**
In the photograph on the right, Sergei Razinkov and Valeri Belov from Arzamas-16 examines an American-made gamma-ray detector. The high-resolution spectrum produced by that detector can be used to determine the relative masses of the different isotopes of nuclear material inside the container. With a precise count of the fission neutrons emitted by the material, and knowing the decay rates of the isotopes of plutonium and uranium, the total mass of each isotope inside the container can be calculated.
The shipping container is then opened and the materials are redistributed among storage containers. New bar codes and radiation passports have to be established for each new storage container.

One worker allocates identification numbers for the new storage containers on the computer terminal while another worker measures their radiation passports. The accounting computer records the radiation passport along with the identification number of each container for future identification purposes (see Figure 4). The precise isotopic composition of the contents of each container is then determined from a high-resolution measurement of the container’s gamma-ray spectrum and fission neutron flux (see Figure 5). A new bar code listing the container’s identification number and the isotopic composition of its contents is printed out for each new storage container.

Now that the material is prepared for storage, one of the workers enters the next destination—the Vault—into the computer terminal. Another reads the bar code on the storage container to start the timer. Like the vault in a bank, the storage vault is barricaded by an extremely heavy door. All three members of the team must be identified by their palm, badge, and personal identification number, and if that team has permission from the Manager’s Office, the controls computer unlocks the door. The computer terminal inside the Vault lists the “station” where each container is to be placed. The team then reads the bar code of each container and its station to register them into the inventory stored on the accounting computer (Figure 6).

The Vault, like the hallways of the demonstration, is continuously watched by video cameras, which are monitored by the controls computer. The images from the camera are digitally processed, and unauthorized changes in the images automatically set off an alarm.

In January 1995, only six months after the contracts with Arzamas-16 had been signed, the demonstration facility was up and running. The successful demonstration spurred interest in the design and possible installation of systems that would meet the specific needs of relevant facilities. Interest was intense in both Russia and the United States. Representatives of the U.S. national laboratories were the first to visit the demonstration, followed by Russian government officials, Russian nuclear facility operators, and American congressmen. In May 1995, the Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov asked Arzamas-16 to transport the demonstration to Moscow and set it up in a conference room next to his office so that it would be accessible to everyone. In a single day, well over one hundred representatives from both Russian and American nuclear facilities and government agencies went through the Arzamas-16 demonstration, including the U.S. Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary.

The Institute of Physics and Power Engineering

The Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) is located about 100 kilometers southwest of Moscow in the city of Obninsk, Russia. Although IPPE is administered by MINATOM, it is not a defense facility but rather a civilian center for research and development of nuclear technologies. At IPPE’s Bystrye Fisicheskie Stendy (BFS) facility, scientists perform research on fast breeder reactors using the two critical assemblies BFS-1 and BFS-2.

In August 1994, not long after we had signed contracts with Arzamas-16, IPPE was brought into the public eye by a front-page article of the New York Times called “Russian Nuclear Materials Controls Are Leaky.” As described in the article, the eight metric tons of highly enriched uranium and plutonium.
at BFS are in the form of thousands of small, hockey-puck-sized disks (Figure 7). The disks, which are used in reactor fuel rods, are “clad” in aluminum or stainless steel that absorbs the alpha and beta radiation of the uranium or plutonium in the disks. Therefore, a thief could simply place a few disks in his pockets without fear of being exposed to radiation. The Times article highlighted the proliferation risks associated with those disks.

Following up on several preliminary contacts in September and October of 1994, John Phillips from Los Alamos and representatives from five other U.S. national laboratories visited IPPE in November to initiate a lab-to-lab MPC&A program there. With the Russian scientists, we decided to concentrate our efforts on the so-called “Stone Sack,” an isolated section within the BFS facility that contains the BFS-1 and BFS-2 reactor rooms, a storage vault, a manager’s office, and a large portion of the most attractive nuclear materials at IPPE.

We began by installing a four-tiered system of controls. At the outermost fence surrounding the BFS facility, we installed a vehicle monitor to detect nuclear material in vehicles leaving the site (Figure 8). Inside the fence, at the entrance to the BFS facility, we put a radiation detector that can detect a single disk of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium. A “people trap” developed by the Russian company Technocom,2 was placed at the entrance to the Stone Sack within BFS. The people trap is a sophisticated system of controls that includes palm, badge, and personal identification number readers, a scale to check the worker’s weight, and metal and radiation detectors. Any violation will trigger the people trap to ensnare the offender. Finally, surveillance cameras were installed to monitor any slight changes in the storage areas and the reactor rooms.

2 Tehnocom is a private enterprise formed by former Arzamas-16 weapons scientists that provides a number of technologies to the Russian defense complex.

Figure 7. Researchers at IPPE
In reactor research, fuel rods of various configurations are built out of large numbers of disks such as the one above. Bar coding the disks that contain nuclear material was the first step in the implementation of computerized accounting at IPPE.

Figure 8. The Vehicle Monitor
The large white posts on either side of the truck contain sensitive gamma-ray and neutron detectors that measure the amount of nuclear material inside the truck. If the measured amount is greater than expected, the vehicle must stop for inspection.
As a precursor to a total computerized accounting system, we installed “stand-alone” accounting equipment in the Stone Sack. The two reactor rooms and the storage vault were equipped with low-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers to measure the radiation passports of the disks. High-resolution gamma-ray spectrometers and fission neutron counters were installed near both of the reactor rooms to measure the isotopic composition of the disks.

The tens of thousands of disks of nuclear material are in the process of being labeled with bar codes that list the identification number and contents of the disk—that process alone is expected to take three years to complete. A network of computers and bar code readers was installed in the two reactor rooms, the storage vault, and the manager’s office, and in the near future, we plan to connect the stand-alone accounting equipment into the network.

The work done at IPPE marked one of the first times the lab-to-lab MPC&A program had implemented a safeguards program that protected real nuclear materials. IPPE also houses the MINATOM training center where workers from other Russian facilities can come to learn about MPC&A.

The Kurchatov Institute

The Kurchatov Institute in Moscow is a leading research center in the design of nuclear reactors for space and naval propulsion. Kurchatov has been independent of MINATOM since 1992. Its accessible location and its advocacy of the importance of improved safeguards made Kurchatov a priority for the lab-to-lab MPC&A program.

We focused our efforts on Building 116 where two critical assemblies, the Nartzis and the Astra, are used for nuclear reactor studies. Like the disks at IPPE, the nuclear material used in Building 116 is in relatively small, and therefore vulnerable, units—tiny “pellets” for the Nartzis and baseball-sized “pebbles” for the Astra. Thousands of such pellets and pebbles, each of which contains a few grams of nuclear material, are kept within the two storage rooms and two reactor rooms in Building 116.

Most of our work at the Kurchatov Institute has addressed the most pressing issue of physical protection. The grounds around Building 116 were cleared of bushes and trees to improve surveillance of the area, and we erected tall, sturdy fences and gates as shown in Figure 10.

We also installed surveillance and certain controls. Video cameras and infrared sensors, which detect the presence of people by the heat they give off, were installed along the perimeter of the facility, and additional cameras were installed inside the building. All windows and all but one entrance to Building 116 were sealed off, and the entrance was equipped with a people trap similar to the one at IPPE.

Lastly, we supported Kurchatov in taking total inventory of the nuclear materials of the two critical assemblies. Computer terminals were placed in each of the critical assembly rooms, and a third was installed in a separate building at the Kurchatov Institute, and the inventory is updated on the computer as it changes.

In December 1994, the Kurchatov Institute was the very first Russian nuclear institute to demonstrate its new safeguards. In February 1996, the Russian Navy visited Building 116. Since then, the Navy has signed contracts through Kurchatov to begin lab-to-lab MPC&A work.

Conclusion

In less than two years, the lab-to-lab MPC&A program has made remarkable progress, and we expect progress to continue. New contracts have been signed to install complete computerized MC&A systems at the Arzamas-16 crit-
ical assembly and processing facility, IPPE’s central storage and processing facilities, and the Kurchatov Institute’s central storage facility. And progress at Chelyabinsk-70 has been steady. Personnel and vehicle monitors have been installed at the Chelyabinsk critical assembly area, and the vehicle monitor has survived its first Siberian winter. Soon we will install a computerized MC&A system there.

Three other Russian nuclear institutes have recently joined our program. Two of them, the Institutes of Automatics and Non-Organics, will be developing and constructing instruments and developing methods for MPC&A. At the third, Tomsk-7, we will be installing computerized MC&A systems at the spent-fuel reprocessing and uranium processing plants. In January 1996, the Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Viktor Mikhailov and the U.S. Secretary of Energy Hazel O’Leary signed a joint statement to open up Sverdlovsk-44 and Krasnoyarsk-26 to the lab-to-lab MPC&A program.

The trust and confidence that has been built up between the Russians and the Americans under the lab-to-lab MPC&A program has helped the government-to-government MPC&A program make progress. Our work has also inspired collaborations with two new Russian agencies. DOE has been allocated 10 million dollars for a new collaboration with Gosatomnadzor (GAN), the Russian equivalent of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the U.S. national laboratories have been allocated 5 million dollars for a collaboration with the Russian Navy which involves the Kurchatov Institute as a partner.

Funding for the lab-to-lab program has increased from the two-million-dollar “start-up” fund of 1994 to 15 million dollars in 1995. Forty-five million dollars are budgeted for 1996, and plans are for funding to expand next year and continue until 2002, at which time Russia and its nuclear institutes should have sufficient infrastructure and resources, both human and technologi-
cal, to carry on the work of MPC&A independently.

Above all, we would like to mention that the commitment of our Russian colleagues has been critical to the success of the lab-to-lab MPC&A program. Without their understanding and vision, we could not have met with such success. On the American side, we would like to acknowledge the contributions of the staff from all six participating DOE laboratories who worked very well together to solve technical, administrative, and cultural problems. The chemistry of the Joint Russian/American team has been tremendous.

Acknowledgements

We would especially like to thank all those at Los Alamos who have made exceptional contributions to the lab-to-lab MPC&A program, including Mark Mullen, Gene Kutyreff, Edward Kern, Cheryl Rodriguez, Tom Sampson, Gregory Sheppard, Susan Voss, Rob York, Boris Rosev, and Richard Wallace. Finally, the program could not have happened without the support and personal involvement of DOE management.

Further Reading


Ronald H. Augustson is the project leader for the Russian/American Lab-to-Lab Nuclear Material Protection, Control, and Accounting program at Los Alamos, and he is a member of that program’s steering group.

Ron received his doctorate in physics from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in 1967. During the same year, Ron joined the Nuclear Materials Safeguards Program at Los Alamos to work on the development and implementation of neutron and gamma-ray based nondestructive assay techniques. In 1977, he was appointed technical project manager and group leader for the development of a dynamic nuclear-materials control system for the Los Alamos plutonium fabrication facility. In the summer of 1979, Ron took a position with the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna for 3 years, work that brought him to Tokai-Mura, Japan. After he returned to Los Alamos in 1982, Ron became the Los Alamos liaison for the U.S. Technical Support Program to the IAEA Safeguards Department. In 1992, he became involved with Russian nuclear safeguards by helping to design the Nunn-Lugar Russian Fissile Material Storage Facility. In the spring of 1994, Ron contributed to the formation of the Russian/American lab-to-lab MPC&A program that led to his present position.

John R. Phillips has served as the team leader for the U.S. multi-laboratory support for the Russian/American MPC&A program at the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk, Russia. He is also a member of a multi-laboratory team developing a program for DOE on Countering Nuclear Smuggling.

John has a Ph.D. in analytical chemistry and an MBA from the University of New Mexico. He has served as a technical expert to the IAEA for the development and implementation of nondestructive assay instrumentation. He has served on a number of advisory groups including the DOE Laboratory Advisory Group on Effluent Research (LAGER). He has served as a member of the UNSCOM inspection team that discovered the calutron and centrifuge enrichment systems in Iraq following the Gulf War. His technical interests include spent-fuel examination, analytical chemistry of actinides, assessment of nuclear capabilities of potential proliferators, and effluent monitoring and analysis.